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PANENTHEISM 
This article originally appeared in the Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, 2003. 
 
Panentheism
Strictly construed this entails that all divine relations are internal relations, that is, 
relations between God as integrated whole and the creatures as included parts.  For panentheism 
then, while the universe is part of God, God and the universe do not form an undifferentiated 
whole.   Panentheism draws definite distinctions between God as the including whole and the 
non-divine parts of the universe considered in themselves.  Certain properties of divinity, such as 
aseity (“self-existence”) or necessary existence and the all-encompassing attributes of 
omnipresence (everywhere present), omniscience (all-knowing), and omnipotence (all power or 
all-powerful) apply to God but definitely not to individual creatures or to the universe itself.  
(Note though that process forms of panentheism find the notion of divine omnipotence 
problematic.)  Another important distinction drawn between God and creatures concerns mutual 
freedom.  Panentheism upholds indeterminism: Spontaneity and free will in the universe mean 
that antecedent causes do not fully determine present events and actions, so the future is not fully 
 literally means “all (is) in God” (from the Greek).  As a concept of God, 
panentheism attempts to do justice both to divine transcendence – that God is “beyond” or more 
than the world – and divine immanence – that God is “in” the world.   Panentheism maintains 
that the world is in God, included in the divine life, but that God’s reality is not reducible to nor 
exhausted by the reality of the individuals or the structures of the universe or of the universe as a 
whole.  Thus God is all-inclusive or all-encompassing with respect to being. 
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predictable or foreknown, even by God; creatures have real choices.  In summary, while God is 
not an individual simply distinct from the non-divine individuals, in the way for example 
that one human being is distinct from another, neither is God to be equated with the universe or 
its constituents. 
 
In construing divine transcendence and immanence as above, panentheism mediates 
between deism and certain forms of traditional theism on the one hand and pantheism on the 
other hand, attempting to avoid pitfalls of both.  Deism, as developed in the European 
Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, holds that God created the world to 
operate according to natural laws but is uninvolved in its destiny.  The God posited by traditional 
theism is not as separate from the universe as is in deism; however, panentheists judge what they 
call 
Panentheism as Alternative 
classical theism to be equally inadequate.  Classical theism, in affirming certain divine 
attributes stemming from ancient Greek philosophy – immutability (unchangeability), 
impassibility (to be unaffected by another), and eternity (in the sense of strict timelessness) – 
does not permit God to be in genuine relation to the world.   
Pantheism literally means “all (is) God.”  That is, everything at least in its true essence is 
divine.  Clearly panentheism has affinities with pantheism.  American Charles Hartshorne (1897-
2000), the principle theological interpreter and developer of process philosophy, at first labeled 
his concept of God, “The New Pantheism.”   The trajectory of German idealism produced both 
pantheists and panentheists.  One could say that panentheism attempts to get as close to 
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pantheism as possible in stressing the intimate relationship between God and nature, while still 
maintaining clear distinctions between them.  A key difference is that pantheism tends to a 
(quasi) materialistic or (quasi) substantialistic understanding of God:  Entities in the world share 
the divine essence or substance to a greater or lesser degree. Therefore, any distinction between 
God as a whole and the constituents of the universe is a matter of degree rather than of kind.  In 
addition, since everything is a mode or attribute of God, pantheism typically denies indeterminate 
freedom.   
The metaphor or analogy of the world as the body of God is popular among panentheists. 
 Hartshorne compares the God-world relationship to that between a person’s mind and the cells 
of its body.  Arthur Peacocke (1924-     ), a key figure in the science and religion dialogue, speaks 
approvingly of the feminine, womb imagery that panentheism encourages: As with a fetus in its 
mother, creation is within God.  American Christian theologian Sallie McFague (1933-    ) has 
been the principal developer of the metaphor of world as body of God.  British philosophical 
theologian Grace Jentzen (1948-    ), in drawing the connection between God and world so tightly 
as to jettison indeterminate freedom, offers a pantheistic version of the metaphor. 
 
Panentheism offers divers advantages for those interested in the intersection of science 
and religion.  Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), in his role as a philosopher of science, and 
others have observed that the dominant model for the natural world moved from mechanism to 
organism during the nineteenth century.   Panentheism offers an organistic understanding of the 
Some Connections with Science 
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God-world relation in contrast to deism’s mechanistic understanding.  Like deism, panentheism 
offers a concept of God where natural laws or processes are respected, where God refrains from 
interventions that overturn nature.  The crucial difference is that panentheism posits a God 
intimately involved, continuously interacting, with the world. 
Panentheism’s intimate connection of God with a world in time entails a God who in 
some sense or dimension is also temporal.  As the trajectory of modern science – from the 
Newtonian mechanics of the Enlightenment to evolution to Einstein’s theory of relativity – has 
put an exclamation point on the temporal nature of reality, panentheism offers a consonant 
concept of the divine. 
As indicated above, creaturely spontaneity and indeterminate freedom are crucial for 
panentheism in its distinction of God from creation.  Both quantum mechanics, in stating that the 
motions of sub-atomic particles are probabilistic rather than determinable from known 
antecedent conditions, and chaos theory, in demonstrating the unpredictability of future events, 
provide openings for panentheists and other supporters of indeterminacy.   In particular, 
Peacocke, British physical chemist, Anglican priest, and panentheistic theologian, applauds 
panentheism’s picture of a God who is continuously creative in relation to an open universe.  It 
must be noted, though, that no consensus exists among scientists that quantum indeterminacy or, 
even less, chaos theory unpredictability entail any ultimate indeterminacy in the universe.    
We have seen that panentheists reject divine supernatural intervention.  Avoiding 
violation of natural processes is also a concern of other theologians involved in the science and 
religion dialogue, including Americans Thomas F. Tracy and Nancey Murphy.  It may seem that 
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such thinkers must renounce any traditional Christian notion of special providence, namely, that 
God causes particular events in natural or human history (in contrast to general providence, that 
God determines the general laws or processes of the universe).  However, this is not uniformly 
the case. 
For example, in his later writings Peacocke develops his notion of top-down causation, 
maintaining that divine action with respect to the universe not only upholds general laws or 
patterns but causes specific events.   Whether such divine pre-determination is compatible with 
indeterminate creaturely decisions and their chance interactions is a major difficulty for this 
viewpoint.   
Murphy and Tracy purchase special providence by positing that God determines the 
probabilistic quantum movements of subatomic particles and that these in turn produce macro-
effects that result in specific events.  The virtue of this notion is that it contravenes no natural 
laws or regularities:  The quantum events that God determines are within the scientifically 
permissible ranges of motion, and apparently no conceivable method exists for discerning God’s 
causation on the quantum level.  At the same time, this “invisibility” is problematic:  That God 
ultimately causes a valued event (as opposed to, say, an event issuing in tremendous evil) appears 
to be a matter of blind faith, at least as far as physics is concerned.   Other problems for this 
viewpoint are the speculative nature of the connection between quantum events and macro 
effects and, for advocates of indeterminacy and openness, the denial that quantum events are 
ultimately indeterminate.  More broadly, critics of the above approaches might judge them to be 
backdoor attempts to reintroduce too much transcendent or interventionist causation by God.  
David H. Nikkel 
Panentheism 
 
 
 6 
  
The term 
Panentheism’s History 
panentheism was coined by German idealist philosopher Carl Christian 
Friedrich Krause (1781-1832).  As mentioned above, German idealism, with strong ties to nature 
Romanticism, produced various panentheistic and pantheistic thinkers.  The clearest and most 
fully developed panentheistic model was that of physicist, experimental psychologist, and 
philosopher, Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887). Earlier examples of panentheism or 
panentheistic tendencies include Western mysticism and Hindu bhakti (referring to devotion to a 
personal god) and its principal theologian Ramanuja (traditional dates, 1017-1137).  These 
examples are not surprising, as mysticism generally softens the creator-creature distinction, while 
in India that distinction is not drawn as sharply as is typical in Western religions. Various 
philosophers and theologians of the twentieth century have been labeled panentheists, including 
Nicolai Berdyaev, William Pepperell Montague, Paul Weiss, Karl Rahner, and John MacQuarrie. 
 While the panentheistic affinities of these thinkers are undeniable, some failed to develop a clear 
panentheistic model, others promoted ideas contrary to basic premises of panentheism, while still 
others explicitly refused the label panentheism for their thought. Coming out of German 
idealism, exile from the Nazis to America Paul Tillich (1886-1965) is regarded as one of the 
premier theologians of the twentieth century.  Tillichians widely acknowledge his panentheism.  
His famous phrase, “God is not a being, but being-itself,” has obvious panentheistic implications. 
 Tillich, who claimed the phrase “eschatological pan-en-theism,” was accused by some critics of 
pantheism, to which he would jokingly respond, “This pantheist is going to take a walk in his 
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garden.”  Tillich’s reluctance to disavow the attributes of divine immutability, impassibility, and 
eternity compromise his manifest panentheistic intentions, according to American theologian 
David Nikkel (1952-     ).   
The fullest explicit development of panentheism in the twentieth century came from 
process thought.  Whitehead, British mathematical physicist and philosopher, originated process 
philosophy, its theism developed and to some extent modified by Hartshorne.  For process 
thought, reality at its depth is not static being but rather a process of becoming.  God is not an 
exception to, but the highest exemplar of, this ultimate or metaphysical principle.  As did 
Fechner, process thought advocates panpsychism, that all integrated entities of the universe 
possess some degree of sentience or feeling. The fundamental unit of reality for process 
philosophy is an occasion of experience.  God, in the consequent nature for Whitehead or the 
concrete pole of divinity for Hartshorne, includes all past occasions of experience.  Process 
panentheism emphasizes omniscience and, to coin a word, omni-pathy (all-feeling). God 
intimately knows all experience, is affected by, sympathizes with, all feelings. As Whitehead 
puts it, “God is the fellow sufferer who understands.”  Whitehead purchases divine transcendence 
through the primordial nature, which is the reservoir of all possibility.  Hartshorne purchases 
same through the abstract pole of divinity, which refers to the changeless character of God, 
namely, that God will always lovingly know and integrate whatever experiences occur in the 
universe.  If the world influences God as object of divine knowledge, likewise God influences the 
non-divine individuals as object of their awareness – as a lure providing preferences for their 
actions. To what extent the divine lure only persuades versus constrains decisions as the 
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unavoidable object of awareness is debated by process theologians.   What is beyond dispute is 
the rejection of omnipotence, which is interpreted to mean God is all-powerful, which would 
overthrow indeterminate freedom. 
 
McFague, mentioned earlier in relation to feminine divine imagery, has presented one of 
the most well-known models of panentheism in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first 
centuries. Her development of metaphors for a God in intimate relation with the world enflesh 
and enhance the sense of the concept of panentheism. On the other hand, her doubts concerning 
what we can actually know about God pose a potential problem for her panentheism.  McFague’s 
minimal Christian theistic claim is that there is a power in the universe on the side of life that is, 
metaphorically speaking, personal. When McFague adds that this power is many rather than one, 
critics may question whether God in her concept or metaphor is sufficiently integrated to 
panentheistically include the universe; critics may question whether there is a difference of 
substance between her view and American Christian theologian Gordon Kaufman’s serendipitous 
creativity, that 
Contemporary Issues 
God
Many theologians in the science and religion dialogue affirm some notion of God’s 
 should refer to the cosmic and evolutionary forces that have resulted in life 
and human life rather than to any personal or agential reality. Contrast McFague’s outlook to that 
of Tillich and Hartshorne, who maintained that God is  “not less than conscious” or 
superconscious (while recognizing the anthropomorphic dangers of attributing conscious 
personhood to God). 
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sustaining creativity common to the Western religious traditions:  Every aspect of every 
particular constituent of the universe is radically contingent, dependent upon divine power for its 
continued existence moment by moment.  Process theism rejects such an understanding of divine 
power.  Whitehead is clear that both divine and finite occasions of experience are manifestations 
of the ultimate metaphysical principle of creative synthesis, each  such occasion possessing 
ultimate independence of being.  Whitehead reasons that if God were upholding the very 
existence of occasions, then indeterminate freedom would be overridden and his panentheism 
would transmute into a pantheism.  Christian process theologians, while often neglecting to 
acknowledge this Whiteheadian perspective on divine power, have not challenged it either.  The 
question for panentheists who wish to retain a notion of divine sustaining activity is this: Can 
omnipotence
–David H. Nikkel 
 be defined as “all power” rather than “all-powerful”?  Can God panentheistically 
encompass all power by sustaining and thus empowering the existence of each creature, as an 
existence with indeterminate freedom?  If such a concept is not self-contradictory, then one can 
avoid pantheism and affirm a notion of divine power more consonant with the all-inclusive logic 
of panentheism. 
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